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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 2-99-cr-00359-001) 
District Judge:  Hon. J. Curtis Joyner 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 11, 2013 
 
Before:   RENDELL, FISHER, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 11, 2013 ) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Kenneth Smith appeals an order of the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to 12 
 2 
 
months’ imprisonment followed by 2 years’ supervised release.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. Background 
In June 2000, Smith was tried and convicted of possessing a firearm after having 
been convicted of a felony, and in 2001 the District Court sentenced him to 120 months’ 
imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.  In February 2011, Smith was released 
from prison and placed on supervised release.  The following month, the District Court 
entered an order modifying the terms of the supervised release to require Smith to submit 
to drug testing and to participate in a drug and alcohol treatment program.  Smith waived 
objection to this modification.   
Smith subsequently volunteered for, and was accepted into the District Court’s 
Supervision to Aid Reentry (“STAR”) program under the oversight of a magistrate judge.  
In May 2011, the magistrate judge entered an order requiring Smith to complete 15 hours 
of community service per week, until he secured gainful employment.  Smith did not 
obtain employment, nor did he complete the required community service.  He also 
continued to use illegal drugs.  In June 2011, the magistrate judge entered an order 
placing Smith in a residential reentry center for 60 days’ treatment. 
Upon release from the treatment center, Smith was required to attend intake 
appointments for additional outpatient treatment at another treatment center.  He failed to 
attend his scheduled appointments.  In January 2012, Smith failed to submit to a urine 
test and, because of his continued use of illegal substances, the magistrate judge ordered 
him to be taken into custody for a period of seven days.  After Smith’s release, a 
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probation officer attempted to arrange intake for further treatment, but Smith repeatedly 
failed to make appointments and lied to the probation officer about his attendance.  In 
April 2012, Smith admitted to the reentry court coordinator that he had relapsed to using 
cocaine, and he submitted a urine sample that tested positive for cocaine.  Smith’s 
probation officer reported the violation of supervised release, and a revocation hearing 
was held.   
At the hearing, Smith claimed that he had not ingested cocaine, but “something 
called cocoa tea” (App at 26).  He did, however, admit the balance of the allegations 
concerning his violations of the terms of his supervised release and of the STAR 
program.  The District Court made no finding as to whether Smith had ingested cocaine 
prior to giving the April 2012 urine sample, but found that Smith had otherwise violated 
the terms of his supervised release.  Without objection, the Court held that Smith was 
guilty of a Grade C violation and determined that the advisory Sentencing Guideline 
range was 8-14 months imprisonment.
1
  The Court sentenced him to 12 months’ 
imprisonment, to be followed by two years’ supervised release.  The Court also directed 
the Bureau of Prisons to provide a mental health examination and treatment for any 
exhibited mental health problems, and further required that Smith be evaluated for 
                                              
1
 That guideline range was incorrect.  Because Smith had a criminal history 
category IV and the violation of his supervised release was a Grade C offense, the correct 
guideline level was 6-12 months.  See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4 & app. note 1.  This mistake 
would ordinarily require a remand for resentencing.  United States v. Knight, 266 F.3d 
203, 207-08 (3d Cir. 2001).  However, Smith did not object to the guideline range at his 
revocation hearing, and does not claim plain error in his brief on appeal, and the issue is 
therefore waived.  United States v. Andrews, 681 F.3d 509, 532 (3d Cir. 2012).  Also, 
when the District Court imposed the sentence, it referred to the range’s correct upper 
limit of 12 months.   
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continued treatment and counseling for his mental health and substance abuse problems 
as a condition of supervised release.   
This timely appeal followed.   
II. Discussion2 
Smith argues that the District Court’s sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment was 
procedurally and substantively unreasonable because the District Court did not fully 
evaluate all of the sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).  Specifically, Smith 
contends that the violations for which he was sentenced are minor and that the District 
Court did not properly weigh his depression and anxiety as reasons for those violations. 
Although Smith does not make any clear distinctions between the procedural and 
substantive unreasonableness of his sentence in his brief on appeal, we address each of 
those sentencing requirements in turn. 
A. Procedural Reasonableness 
“To demonstrate that a sentence is procedurally reasonable, a district court must 
show meaningful consideration of the relevant statutory factors and the exercise of 
                                              
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review a district 
court’s sentence upon revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 542 (3d Cir. 2007).  We will not disturb the sentence 
imposed for a violation of supervised release unless it is “plainly unreasonable.”  United 
States v. Blackston, 940 F.2d 877, 894 (3d Cir. 1991).  “Our review for reasonableness 
proceeds in two stages: (1) First, we ensure that the district court committed no 
significant procedural error ... [and] (2) if the district court’s procedures are sound, we 
proceed to examine the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.”  United States v. 
Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “[T]he party challenging the sentence bears the burden of proving the 
sentence’s unreasonableness.”  Id. 
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independent judgment.”  United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 360 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   A district court imposing a new sentence in the 
context of supervised release must weigh the relevant § 3553(a) factors, as directed by 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(e), as well as the policies set forth in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing 
Guidelines.  United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540, 543-44 (3d Cir. 2007).  A sentence is 
procedurally unreasonable when a district court fails to calculate the Guidelines 
sentencing range, or calculates the range incorrectly; treats the Guidelines as mandatory; 
bases a sentence on clearly erroneous facts; or fails to adequately explain the sentence 
imposed.  Friedman, 658 F.3d at 360. 
The sentence given by the District Court here was procedurally reasonable.  The 
Court calculated the Guidelines range
3
 and weighed the § 3553(a) factors, expressly 
noting the ones it found relevant to Smith’s case.  Those factors included: (1) Smith’s 
repeated failure to attend appointments and frequent violations of the terms of his 
supervised release (as well the reasons that Smith offered for those lapses); (2) Smith’s 
history of having served a 10-year sentence following his conviction as a felon in 
possession of a firearm; (3) Smith’s personal characteristics, including his substance 
abuse and apparent mental health problems; and (4) Smith’s failure to take advantage of 
the Court’s attempts to assist him during the course of his supervised release. 
 Although a sentencing judge is required to state his reasons for the sentence 
imposed, a lengthy and detailed opinion is not required.  Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 
                                              
3
 Even though the District Court calculated the Guideline range incorrectly, see 
supra note 1, the Court cited the range’s correct upper limit when it imposed the 
sentence, and that sentence was within the correct range.  
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338, 356 (2007).  The District Court in this case carefully described its consideration of 
the § 3553(a) factors and its reasons for imposing the sentence.  Because “[t]he record 
makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing,” United States v. 
Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 2006), there is no basis for Smith’s claim that the 
sentence was procedurally incorrect. 
B. Substantive Reasonableness  
Smith argues on two separate grounds that the District Court’s revocation of his 
supervised release was substantively unreasonable.  First, he contends that “revocation is 
appropriate only on a second violation, after a finding of a violation” (Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 15), citing a Sentencing Guidelines application note in support of that 
contention.
4
  However, the Guideline itself expressly permits revocation of supervised 
release “[u]pon a finding of a Grade C violation,” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(a)(2), and makes no 
mention of the requirement of a second violation.  Moreover, the imposition of a sentence 
remains within the sound discretion of the District Court.  See Friedman, 658 F.3d at 360 
(noting that a sentence is substantively reasonable “unless no reasonable sentencing court 
would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the 
district court provided” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   In this case, the Court 
determined that revocation of Smith’s supervised release, without waiting for a second 
Grade C violation, would “prevent him from at least abusing any drugs” and would 
                                              
4
 The application note at issue says that “[r]evocation of … supervised release 
generally is the appropriate disposition in the case of a Grade C violation by a defendant 
who, having been continued on supervision after a finding of violation, again violates the 
conditions of his supervision.”  U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3 app. n.1.   Smith incorrectly cites to 
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4. 
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“clean him out and make him available to at least address his mental health problems and 
any drug problems once he’s released from prison.”  (App. at 30.)  We cannot say that 
that was substantively unreasonable, given the pattern of Smith’s behavior while he was 
on supervised release. 
Second, Smith contends that the revocation of his supervised release was 
substantively unreasonable because the District Court incarcerated him for his controlled 
substance lapses.  That is not accurate.  Because the Court could not definitively say that 
the positive drug test result was due to Smith’s ingestion of cocaine, the Court made no 
finding as to Smith’s use of drugs on the occasion in question.  Rather, the Court found 
that Smith had repeatedly failed to comply with the terms of his supervised release and 
with the requirements of the STAR program, and the Court revoked Smith’s supervised 
release based on that pattern of noncompliance.  There was nothing substantively 
unreasonable about the Court’s decision in that regard. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
